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United States v. Tunick case filings

A bundle of the two public filings in United States v. Tunick, No. 1:25-cr-00499-ELR-CCB (N.D. Ga., Atlanta Division), captured 26 July 2026 from copies published by TechCrunch on DocumentCloud and from the CourtListener RECAP mirror:

  • Indictment — one count under 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a), returned under seal and filed 13 November 2025, signed for the government by AUSA Matthew S. Carrico.
  • Motion to suppress evidence and statements — filed 17 March 2026 by federal defender Melissa McGrane.

What the indictment charges

The grand jury charges that on 24 January 2025 Tunick, “before and during the search for and seizure of property” by a CBP Tactical Terrorism Response Team supervisory officer, “did knowingly destroy, damage, waste, dispose of” and otherwise act “to delete the digital contents of a Google Pixel cellular phone, for the purpose of preventing and impairing the Government’s lawful authority” to take it into custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a). The “before and during” framing is the charging document’s own answer to the statute’s timing question: the government reads § 2232(a) to reach destruction that precedes physical seizure. The document contains the typo “Untied States Code.”

What the motion argues

The defense moves to suppress on three grounds, each with direct citations:

  1. Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Tunick gave officers the passwords to his phone and e-reader during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, after repeatedly invoking his right to a lawyer (Miranda, Escobedo, Jackson v. Denno). The motion quotes the interrogation recording: officers introduced themselves as “looking for people who are pedophiles” [19:49:00], told him “because you’re refusing to talk, which is your right, we have the authority to go through your phone” [20:00:40], and answered his lawyer request with “when it comes to immigration and customs, right, it’s a whole different ballgame . . . we have search authority, we don’t need a warrant” [20:05:09]. It cites In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (11th Cir. 2012) for the proposition that compelled decryption is testimonial — the same case that rejected the foregone-conclusion doctrine in Encryption key disclosure compulsion.
  2. Fruit of the poisonous tree. The phone’s wiped state is itself the fruit of the un-Mirandized interrogation, distinguishable from United States v. Patane because the fruit here is testimonial in nature.
  3. Fourth Amendment. The stop was a pre-planned investigation of domestic political activity, not a border-contraband search. The motion records that FBI Atlanta joint-terrorism-taskforce personnel coordinated the interception with CBP in advance, that the government classifies the Defend the Atlanta Forest movement as an “Anti-Government, Anti-Authority Violent Extremist Group” without evidence Tunick committed any crime, and that a DHS agent told him his devices would be returned after thirty days and that he was “not under arrest but once these gentleman are done with you . . . you’re free to leave” [20:35:15]. It attacks the Eleventh Circuit’s suspicionless-device-search rule in United States v. Touset using the contrary circuit line: United States v. Aigbekaen and United States v. Kolsuz (4th Cir.), United States v. Qin (1st Cir.), and United States v. Cano (9th Cir.).

The motion also supplies case facts the press reports did not: Tunick surrendered passwords to both a phone and an e-reader, and the motion dates the facility dispute to an 85-acre, $115 million training center in the South River Forest.

Limitations

These are party documents, not findings of fact: the indictment is the government’s untested accusation, and the motion is the defense’s untested characterization. Quoted interrogation lines are the defense’s transcription with its timestamps, not an independent transcript. The court’s suppression ruling, expected after October 2026, is the first test of either account.

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